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ARTICLES
The Cost of Good Intentions: Why the
Supreme Court's Decision Upholding
Affirmative Action Admission Programs is
Detrimental to the Cause
Leslie Yalof Garfield'
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bolinger,2 which
upheld the University of Michigan School of Law's race-prefer-
ence admission plan, seemed cause for celebration among af-
firmative action proponents. The decision marked the first time
that the Court upheld a race-preference admission plan against
an Equal Protection challenge.3 Though the decision is
celebratory in theory, in fact it is not much of a gain for those
who believe that the only way to ensure a diverse classroom is
through affirmative action programs.
Specifically, the Court ruled that an affirmative action ad-
mission policy is permissible if it provides for admissions of-
ficers to individually review each applicant. 4 Individual review,
the Court found, allowed for admissions officers to consider race
as a factor in the admissions process, but not to the exclusion of
other personal attributes that might add to diversity in the
1. Professor of Law, Pace Law School. B.A., with Honors, Univ. of Florida,
1982; J.D., Univ. of Florida, 1985. The author would like to thank Kristin Furrie
and Katy O'Connor for their outstanding research assistance.
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337, 341.
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classroom.5 Considering race as one factor among many passed
Constitutional muster.6
Proponents of affirmative action heralded the Grutter deci-
sion because it retained Justice Powell's edict in Regents of the
University of California at Davis v. Bakke,7 that race can be con-
sidered as a factor in the admissions process. However, the re-
ality of the decision means that schools must construct
affirmative action policies that meet the stringent limitations of
the Court's most recent decision on the issue. s Specifically,
post-secondary schools that choose to consider race as a factor
in admissions must individually review each applicant to the
school. 9
Ensuring individual review is an attainable goal for law
schools and small liberal arts colleges. 10 However, such a goal
is highly problematic for large universities as their applicant
pool can be as high as 500% of that of the smaller schools."
Consequently, the only way for a large number of the country's
colleges and universities to meet the demands of the Grutter de-
cision is to hire additional admissions officers who can provide
the kind of review mandated by the Court.' 2
5. Id. at 334-41.
6. Id. at 342-44. The Court established that a university's objective of achiev-
ing racial diversity to further its educational mission is a compelling governmental
interest that can survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 328-30. The Court confirmed that
the Law School's use of race is a "plus" factor when considering applicants individ-
ually is narrowly tailored because non-minority applicants are not unduly harmed.
Id. at 341-44.
7. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-44 (upholding the University of Michigan Law
School's affirmative action policy because it provided for individual review of each
applicant, whereby race became a "plus" factor among the multitude of diversity
factors used in admissions).
10. For example, the University of Michigan Law School received "more than
3,500 applications each year for a class of around 350 students." Id. at 312-13.
11. In fact, the University of Michigan said as much in its arguments before
the Court. However, in his decision in Gratz, Justice Rehnquist rejected the posi-
tion. Respondent's Brief at 6 n.8, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (No.
02-516), available at 2003 WL 402237 (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
12. See, e.g., Greg Winter, After Ruling, 3 Universities Maintain Diversity in
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at A22 (noting that Ohio State "spent an
additional $250,000 on the admissions process this year [the year following the
Supreme Court decisions in Gratz and Grutter], and added thirty-five application
readers"); Karen W. Arenson, The Supreme Court: Affirmative Action, Impact on
Universities Will Range From None to a Lot, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A22
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss1/2
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However, hiring additional admissions officers comes at a
cost. Like most other services, this cost is passed to the con-
sumers. The most logical way for schools to foot the bill for the
Grutter mandate therefore is to increase the application fee to
the nation's institutes of higher education. While this is a
seemingly innocuous means to meet the higher goal of achieving
diversity in the classroom, the practical effect of increasing ap-
plication fees is that it will arguably deter a disproportionate
number of underrepresented minorities, who are often members
of the lowest socio-economic classes.13 If this assumption is in-
deed true, then the very decision that has been heralded for
achieving diversity in the classroom will, in fact, result in quite
the opposite.
II. The Advent of Affirmative Action in College Admissions
To understand the dilemma that those charged with creat-
ing affirmative action admission programs face, it is important
to have a sense of how the application process works. As a gen-
eral matter, the college and post-college application review pro-
cess is quite uniform among American institutions of higher
education. Most schools require applicants to submit their high
school transcript, standardized test scores, 14 a summary of their
co-curricular and extra-curricular activities, personal recom-
mendations and a personal statement.15 High school tran-
(quoting Michigan President, Dr. Mary Sue Coleman as saying "Michigan is likely
to have to expand its admissions staff' in order to provide for individual review).
13. Application fee waivers are available at many universities. However, re-
questing such a waiver is typically a separate, additional task and not part of the
application for admission. Students must demonstrate financial need and these
requests are subject to rejection. In the case of the University of Michigan School
of Law, waivers requested exceed the number available and are awarded on a
"first-come, first-served basis." See University of Michigan Law School: Prospective
Students, http://www.law.umich.edu/prospectivestudents/admissions/appfee.htm
(last visited September 6, 2006).
14. This can include, among other tests, SAT I, SAT II, GMAT, and MCAT.
15. The Princeton Review, What You Should Know Before You Apply, http:I/
www.princetonreview.com/college/apply/articles/process/appprimer.asp (last vis-
ited September 6, 2006). Over 250 schools have adopted the common application,
which is a standard, uniform application form that is used for admission to under-
graduate programs. See Welcome to the Common App!, http://www.commonapp.
org (last visited September 6, 2006) (the Common Application is used by nearly
300 member colleges and universities for admission to their undergraduate pro-
grams). More and more colleges are using the common application, as there are
20061
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scripts provide admissions officials with an understanding of a
student's academic achievement and the rigor of his or her edu-
cational experience. Most schools provide colleges with a cumu-
lative grade point average (GPA), which provides reviewers
with an objective quantifiable number against which they can
measure other applicants. 16 The co-curricular and extra curric-
ular activity sheet, personal statement, and recommendations
provide reviewers with an understanding of who the student is,
what makes her unique and what she will contribute to the in-
stitution to which she is applying. 17
Admissions officials also pay a significant amount of atten-
tion to standardized test scores. Standardized test scores are
an essential component of the application process because they
are easily quantifiable, easily comparable and, arguably, objec-
twenty-three new member colleges/universities for 2005-2006. See Id.; see also
Rachel Moran, Sorting and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in Public Schools, 34
AKRON L. REV. 107 (2000):
In 1892, the National Education Association created the Committee of Ten
to draft recommendations for strengthening the curriculum in America's
high schools. This group was the first "blue ribbon panel" to address such
an issue. The Committee's work was influential in developing not only sec-
ondary school course offerings, but also standards for college admissions.
The resulting recommendations focused on giving modern academic subjects
the same weight as classical ones and on ensuring that all students received
the same preparation for "the duties of life" through a liberal education, re-
gardless of whether they were college-bound. The Committee of Ten's report
prompted the formation of yet another committee, this time to review col-
lege admissions criteria. As a result of efforts to standardize high school
graduation and college entry requirements, the College Entrance Examina-
tion Board was established. The Board developed a unified examination
system for admission to college. The topics chosen for the test shaped high
school offerings at schools with students headed for higher education; the
scope and difficulty of the tests established something akin to voluntary na-
tional standards in each subject.
Id. at 110.
16. See The Princeton Review, Competition in the Application Process - Myth
vs. Fact, http://www.princetonreview.com/college/apply/articles/process/competi-
tion.asp (last visited September 6, 2006) ("[tloday the primary factor in college ad-
mission is the high school transcript.").
17. See The Princeton Review, Sophomore Year - Time to Narrow Down Your
Extra Curricular Activities, http://www.princetonreview.com/college/research/arti-
cles/prepare/extracurriculars.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) ("[t]o a large extent, a
college's opinion of how interesting you are will be determined by what you do
when you're not in class. Your extracurricular activities can play a big part in
distinguishing you from other applicants and determining your chances for
admission.").
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss1/2
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tive.18 Indeed, the widespread and heavy reliance on these
scores have made them "a fixture of the college application pro-
cess."'19 The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 20 is the most widely
used standardized test score. 21 The SAT was created in the
mid-1940s to eliminate the elitist favoritism that was rampant
among admissions offices in America's top colleges and univer-
sities.22 In order to even the playing field, Henry Chauncey,
Chief of the Educational Testing Service (ETS) and James Bry-
ant Conant, Harvard University President, worked together to
make the SAT a "hurdle for admission to the country's prime
universities."23 Their efforts succeeded and the SAT took off as
one of the two most important means for evaluating students
18. See Theodore M. Shaw, Comments of Theodore M. Shaw, 30 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 489 (Summer 1999):
There was a [New York Times] series about athletics in New York City. It
focused on who gets what and who doesn't get what. You take these vast
inequalities, and then get to the college application process. You then real-
ize that over the last thirty years, we have increasingly become a society run
as a testocracy where the opportunities one gets in life depends, in large
part, on which institutions one has attended and how one performs on stan-
dardized tests. These standardized tests reflect in part, who is class privi-
leged, since we know that the strongest correlation on the SAT, or even the
LSAT, is with economic status or whether your parents went to college,
graduate or professional school.
Id. at 492.
19. Moran, supra note 15, at 111.
20. Originally, the SAT was called the "Scholastic Aptitude Test," but in 1997
the Educational Testing Service (ETS) changed the name to the "Scholastic Assess-
ment Test." Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in THE BLACK-WHITE
TEST SCORE GAP 64-66 (Christopher Jenkins & Meredith Phillips eds., Brookings
Institute 1998). If the SAT measures aptitude and African-Americans score lower
on the SAT than white students, this suggests that African-Americans suffer from
"some kind of innate disability." Id. at 66. After unsuccessfully arguing that "the
SAT measured abilities developed over many years," ETS changed the name of the
SAT to the Scholastic Assessment Test. Id.; see also Shaw, supra note 18, at 489.
21. The ACT is another standardized test that first began in 1959. See FAQs
About Signing Up For and Taking the Test, http://www.actstudent.orgfaq/faq.
htmll (last visited September 6, 2006). While not as popular as the SAT, nearly 1.2
million students took the ACT in 2004. Id. The test covers English, math, read-
ing, and science, and is taken by more than 50% of high school graduates in ap-
proximately 25 states. Id.; see also ACT or SAT - How to Choose Between the SAT
and the ACT?, http://collegeapps.about.com/od/satactandotherexams/f/satoract.
htm (last visited September 12, 2006).
22. Hardy Green, How the SATs Changed America, BusINESS WEEK, Oct. 25,
1999, at 15.
23. Id. Interestingly, Carl Brigham who invented the SAT was opposed to
ETS and it was not formed until after his death. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST:
5
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for admission to school (the other being high school grade point
average). 24
As the 1950's progressed, college enrollment increased dra-
matically and more schools began to require the SAT. 25 In 1957
over half a million students took the SAT. 26 By 1970, over two
million students were taking the SAT each year.27 In 2003 a
record number of students took the SAT, marking the largest
increase in the number of test takers in fifteen years. 28
The SAT provided a quick and dirty means to admit stu-
dents. 29 Indeed, the use of these standardized tests proved so
beneficial to expediting the admission process that graduate
schools soon joined the bandwagon.30 Admission to law school is
predicated on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), 31 gradu-
ate schools consider an applicant's score on the Graduate Man-
THE SECRET OF HISTORY OF AMERICAN MERITOCRACY 268 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux
eds., 1999).
24. LEMANN, supra note 23, at 155-56.
25. Id. at 85.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 218.
28. In 2003, 1.4 million students took the SAT, and earned average scores of
519 for math and 507 for verbal. KRISTIN CARNAHAN & CHIARA COLETTI, THE COL-
LEGE BOARD, SAT VERBAL AND MATH SCORES UP SIGNIFICANTLY AS A RECORD-
BREAKING NUMBER OF STUDENTS TAKE THE TEST: AVERAGE MATH SCORE AT HIGHEST
LEVEL IN MORE THAN 35 YEARS (2003), http://www.collegeboard.com/prod
downloads/about/news-info/cbsenior/yr2003/pdf/CBS2003Report.pdf. The number
rose slightly in 2004, when a record setting 1,419,007 high school students took the
SAT. Average scores were 508 for verbal and 518 for math. KRISTIN CARNAHAN &
CHIARA COLETTI, COLLEGE BOARD, SAT SCORES HOLD STEADY FOR COLLEGE BOUND
SENIORS (2004), http://www.collegeboard.conproddownloads/about/newsinfo/cb-
senior/yr2004/CBS2004Report.pdf.
29. See Michael A. Olivas, Affirmative Action: Diversity of Opinions: Constitu-
tional Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in
Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1070 (1997) (noting that test scores
and grades are "extremely useful in sorting out applications."); Brief for the Re-
spondent at 6, n.8, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) (arguing
that due to the volume of applications, individual review is overly burdensome).
30. The MCAT was first developed in 1928, but did not become the narrow
MCAT that we know today, focusing on science and cognitive skills, until 1977.
See Robert C. Bowman, M.D., History of the MCAT, http://www.unmc.edu/Commu-
nity/ruralmeded/history-of the-mcat.htm (last visited September 6, 2006). The
LSAT was first administered in February of 1948. See Law School Admission
Council, http://www.lsacnet.orgfLSAC.asp?url=lsac/research-reports/RR-94-OlEx-
ecutiveSummary.htm (last visited September 6, 2006).
31. See Law School Admission Council, http://www.lsac.org(LSAC.asp?url=
lsac/about-the-lsat.asp (last visited September 6, 2006) ("[t]he Law School Admis-
sion Test (LSAT) is a half-day standardized test required for admission to all ABA-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss1/2
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agement Admissions Test (GMAT), 32 and medical schools
require applicants to take the Medical College Admissions Test
(MCAT). 33
College admissions officials generally looked at the mean
standardized test score and grade point average of their appli-
cant pool, comparing those factors against students admitted to
the academic institution in previous years and were able to
draw a line, marking the point at which students would be ac-
cepted or rejected from a school.34 Students above the mean
were considered for admission to the school; students below the
mean were rejected. Consequently, a student's standardized
test score often dictated the likelihood of admission to a college,
university or graduate school. 35
approved law schools, most Canadian law schools, and many non-ABA-approved
law schools.").
32. See Why Use the GMAT Exam?, http://www.gmac.com/gmac/TheGMAT/
WhatIstheGMAT/WhyUsetheGMAT.htm (last visited September 6, 2006)
("[tihousands of graduate management programs around the world use the Gradu-
ate Management Admission Test in their admissions process."). The Graduate
Management Admission Test (GMAT) examination consists of three main parts,
the Analytical Writing Assessment, Quantitative section, and Verbal section. See
Format and Length, http://www.gmac.com/gmac/TheGMAT/WhatIstheGMAT/
FormatandLength.htm (last visited September 20, 2006).
33. See Welcome to the Official Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) Web-
site, http://www.aamc.org/students/mcat/start.htm (last visited September 6, 2006)
("[tihe Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) is a standardized, multiple-choice
examination designed to assess problem solving, critical thinking, and writing
skills in addition to the examinee's knowledge of science concepts and principles
prerequisite to the study of medicine. Scores are reported in each of the following
areas: Verbal Reasoning, Physical Sciences, Writing Sample, and Biological Sci-
ences. Medical college admission committees consider MCAT scores as part of
their admission decision process.").
34. College admissions officials generally consider factors such as grades, test
scores, high school curriculum strength, high school quality, geography, alumni
relationships, leadership, race, and ethnicity. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 253-54 (2003) (noting the admission factors used by the University of
Michigan). The pressure to use SAT scores is increased by the use of mean SAT/
ACT scores in ranking colleges. U.S. News & World Report considers mean SAT/
ACT score as part of a measure of the school's selectivity. See America's Best Col-
leges 2007: Undergraduate Ranking Criteria and Weights, http://www.usnews.
conusnews/edu/college/rankings/aboutweightbrief.php (last visited September
20, 2006). The mean SAT/ACT scores actually have more weight than high school
G.P.A. See Id.
35. William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates "Built-In
Headwinds": An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 131 (2002) (calling the SAT the "gatekeeper of higher education)
(citing GEORGE H. HANFORD, LIFE WITH THE SAT: AsSESSING OUR YOUNG PEOPLE
7
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Relying on standardized tests, however, became increas-
ingly problematic as it tended to benefit non-minorities and to
have a deleterious effect on minorities. 36 As a general matter,
African- Americans performed less well on the tests than their
non-minority peers.37 Many agreed that the tests asked ques-
tions that were biased against minorities.38 "The Scholastic
Achievement Test, [in particular] ... has been widely criticized
in this regard."39
Indeed, the bias in the SAT is caused by a variety of fac-
tors40 and the precise explanation for the fact that minorities
AND OUR TIMES 90 (1991)) (stating that, according to former College Board Presi-
dent George Hanford, "the SAT served 'as the most widely used and possibly the
most important single talent search device the country had.").
36. See Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black and White Test
Score Gap: An Introduction, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 20,
at 7-8; Thomas J. Kane, Racial & Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, THE
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 20, at 431-56; see also, Kenneth L.
Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, and the NCAA, 8 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 141, 145 ("[tlhe average SAT score for African Americans in the 1980s
and 1990s has hovered around 730, while the average for whites during this same
period of time has remained about 200 points higher at approximately 930.").
37. LEMANN, supra note 23, at 155-56. See also Jencks & Phillips, supra note
36, at 1 ("[tlhe typical American black still scores below 75 percent of American
whites on most standardized tests. On some tests the typical American black
scores below more than 85 percent of whites."); Kidder & Rosner, supra note 35, at
131 ("data from the [N]ational Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the
National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS), and the SAT all confirm the
results of state educational assessments: African-Americans and Latino Students
lag behind their peers from other ethnic groups at every educational level").
38. Id. In fact, in 1972 ETS's director of minority affairs, Chuck Stone, quit
ETS and publicly announced that the test was biased against minorities. LEMANN,
supra note 23, at 221; see also Shropshire, supra note 36, at 150 (listing examples
of common arguments made by those who assert the SAT is not biased).
39. Stuart Biegel, School Choice Policy and Title VI: Maximizing Equal Access
for K-12 Students in a Substantially Deregulated Educational Environment, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1533, 1574 (1995) (citing Jonathan Baron & M. Frank Norman,
SAT's, Achievement Tests, and High School Class Rank, as Predictors of College
Performance, 52 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 1047 (1992) (noting that
Achievement Test results correlated more consistently with class rank than did
SAT scores in a study at the University of Pennsylvania)); see generally JAMES
CROUSE & DALE TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT (1988) (discussing, inter
alia, the negative impact on black and lower-income college students).
40. See for example Jencks, supra note 20, at 55-85, discussing labeling bias
("when the tests claim to measure one thing but actually measure something
else"), content bias ("when a test claims to measure something that could in princi-
ple be measured in an unbiased way, but fails to do so because it contains ques-
tions that favor one group over another"), methodological bias ("when a test
assesses mastery of some skill or body of information using a technique or method
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss1/2
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have traditionally scored lower than non-minority students has
not been fully determined. 41 However, a prominent explanation
is that the test is biased because the questions on the SAT re-
quire knowledge of "[wihite upper-middle class social norms." 42
A common cited example of a culturally biased question from an
early 1980s exam is:
RUNNER: MARATHON
(A) envoy: embassy
(B) martyr: massacre
(C) oarsman: regatta
(D) horse: stable43
Approximately 53% of whites chose C, the correct answer,
but only 22% of African-Americans chose C. 44 Critics of the test
hypothesized that test takers from lower income households
failed to properly answer the question because the word regatta
was not in their vernacular.45
that underestimates the competence of one group relative to another"), prediction
bias ("whenever a test is used to predict an individual's future performance"), and
selection system bias (which arises whenever three conditions are met: "(1) per-
formance depends partly on cognitive skills and partly on other traits; (2) it is easy
to measure cognitive skills but hard to measure the other traits that determine
performance: and (3) the racial disparity in cognitive skills is larger than the racial
disparity in the other, unmeasured traits that influence performance").
41. See Id. (examining the roles of test structure bias, heredity, environment,
family, and income in the black-white test score gap). Those assessing the clear
disparity among test scores thought it was because objective tests tested skills
taught in schools that they were not allowed to attend. See Kidder & Rosner,
supra note 35, at 155-58 ("[r]ace was the one area that threw the contradiction
between the idea of the system (that it would fully deliver on the promise of Ameri-
can democracy) and the reality of it (that it apportioned opportunity on the basis of
a single, highly background-sensitive quality) into the starkest relief.").
42. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 35, at 156 n.74 (citing John Weiss, The
Golden Rule Bias Reduction Principle: A Practical Reform, 6 EDUC. MEASUREMENT
ISSUES & PRACTICE 23-24 (Summer 1987)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Not all the questions where minorities score lower than non-minorities are
racially biased. In fact, on many SAT questions that appear facially neutral,
whites still score much higher than African-Americans. Id. at 153-55. For
example:
The singer now performs a more - repertoire of songs than in the
past, when he sang only traditional ballads.
(A) sentimental
(B) experimental
(C) mellow
(D) customary
9
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The disparate impact of the SAT yielded a widening divide
of access to education between the elite and members of low
socio-economic status and/or underrepresented minority clas-
ses.46 This growing inequity in admissions as a result of heavy
reliance on the standardized test became a problem against the
landscape of the emerging civil rights movement. 47 As a general
matter, politicians, government officials, and educators showed
a heightened awareness of the lack of accessibility to higher ed-
ucation, and ultimately the professions for which these schools
trained students. Consequently, colleges and post-graduate in-
(E) wary
Id. at 153. While 59% of whites answered correctly (choosing B), just 37% of Afri-
can-Americans answered correctly. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 35, at 153. There-
fore, questions where minorities score lower than non-minorities are not always
easily identified. Id. In their article, Kidder and Rosner suggest that the problem
of culturally biased questions is magnified because the disparate impact on minori-
ties is built-in to the system, which results in a perpetual system of bias. Id. at
146. The SAT contains scored questions and un-scored questions. Id. The ETS
statistically analyzes the answers to the unscore questions to determine whether
they will appear on future SAT exams. Id. In particular, the ETS seeks to ensure
that the questions (1) are reliable, which means consistent with the rest of the
exam and (2) meet a specified level of difficultly. Id. at 156. ETS determines relia-
bility based upon "the correlation between performance on that item and perform-
ance on the test overall." Id. at 157. As mentioned above, whites tend to answer
some questions correctly more often than African-Americans. Id. at 156. The con-
verse-African-Americans students tend to answer some questions correctly more
often the white students-is also true. Id. at 158. However, due to the reliability
requirements in selecting questions, the pre-tested questions where African-Amer-
ican students out perform white students are not often included in the SAT. Id.
Questions with bias favoring "[w]hites will tend to spuriously appear as reliable
... because the benchmark of reliability is simply the sum total of all biased and
unbiased questions-meaning there is a 'tyranny of the majority' dilemma inher-
ent in the way reliability is constructed." Id. at 158. Thus, the system of pre-test-
ing questions is a "self-perpetuating" system that continues to result in a disparate
impact on minorities. Id. at 158-59.
46. See generally Nicholas Lemann, The Great Sorting, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 1995, at 84.
47. The SAT was widely in use by the 1950s. At the same time, the Civil
Rights movement was emerging. In 1957, Congress passed the first civil rights
legislation since Reconstruction. See The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Civil
Rights - The Civil Rights Act of 1957, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/D1/
CivilRights-Civil RightsAct/CivilRightsActfiles.html (last visited September 6,
2006). The Civil Rights Act of 1957 provided for the enforcement of voting rights
and criminal civil rights violations that were originally prohibited in the 1870's.
Id. The Act also established the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.
Id. Then in 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Bill into law. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss1/2
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stitutions created a means to increase enrollment of minority
students in their classes.
Starting in the early 1960s, admissions officials began to
vary the manner in which minority groups were accepted to
their schools. Many schools devised quota systems or other
preferential policies that ensured that minority applicants were
accepted to their colleges, universities and graduate schools,
even if the applicants presented objective test scores that were
not competitive with the majority of the school's applicants.
These programs, which were primarily designed to increase en-
rollment among African-American applicants, came to be
termed "affirmative action admission policies."48
Some of the earliest affirmative action admissions policies
took the form of a quota system.49 Schools would set aside a
number of seats for minority applicants, whose admissions files
were not competitive with the files of non-minority applicants. 50
In 1978, the Supreme Court struck down the use of quotas in
the admissions process and schools changed their programs to
enhance minority admissions "without reserving positions or
benefits exclusively for minorities."51 Colleges and universities
created newly reconstituted affirmative action programs, which
employed preferential treatment measures where factors such
as race, gender, and ethnic origin were considered positive fac-
tors in admissions and scholarship determinations. 52 These
programs ranged from allowing for separate review of minority
48. See Civil Rights.Org, Civil Rights 101, http://www.civilrights.org/re-
searchcenter/civilrightslOl/affirmaction.html (last visited September 6, 2006)
("[aiffirmative Action itself has been defined as 'any measure, beyond simple ter-
mination of a discriminatory practice, adopted to correct or compensate for past or
present discrimination or to prevent discrimination from recurring in the future.'"
(internal citation omitted)). The term was first used by President Kennedy in Exec-
utive Order No. 10925, calling for federal contractors to "take affirmative action to
ensure" equal opportunity in the construction industry. Id. The term then spread,
and was used to describe initiatives in the employment of disabled veterans and
equal opportunity in education. Id.
49. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 273-275
(1978) (where the school's special admission program reserved sixteen out of every
100 seats for minority students).
50. This type of program was struck down in Bakke. See discussion infra Part
II.
51. Samuel L. Starks, Understanding Governmentt Affirmative Action and
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 41 DuKE L.J. 933, 941 n.43 (1992).
52. Id.
2006]
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applicants as a group and non-minority applicants, 53 to giving
"points" to minority applicants, 54 to considering race as a factor
in the application process. 55
The preferential nature of these programs gave rise to liti-
gation from school applicants who were denied admission to
their schools, arguably in favor of minority students with less
impressive objective scores. 56 Litigants challenged the affirma-
tive action admission programs as violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically,
these challenges argue that considering race as a factor in the
admissions process unfairly favors one class over another. Sur-
prisingly, only three challenges have reached the Supreme
Court.5 7 Through these challenges, however, the Court has ar-
53. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d
932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033. The University of Texas had two
separate reviewing subcommittees. Id. at 562. The Chair of the Admissions Com-
mittee set a different presumptive admission or denial Texas Index ("TI") number
for minorities, who were reviewed by one subcommittee and for non-minorities,
who were reviewed by a separate subcommittee. Id. at 561. The Admissions Com-
mittee based acceptance to the University for all applicants on an index number
that was a function of each applicant's combined undergraduate grade point aver-
age and LSAT score. Id. at 557 n.9. The Chair set numbers that marked auto-
matic admissions and denials, and the subcommittees reviewed applicants based
on those numbers. Id. at 560-61.
54. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 244, 252-55 (2003). The University of
Michigan used a points system from 1995-1998 that resulted in a certain number
of spots being "protected" for minority candidates. Id. at 254-255. Students could
receive points for underrepresented minority status or socioeconomic disadvan-
tage. Id. at 255. Every application received points for such things as high school
grade point average, standardized test scores and personal achievement or leader-
ship. Id.
55. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School's admissions policy, adopted in 1992, called for
race to be considered as a factor in the admission review process. Id. at 832. While
grades were also a factor, the rationale for admitting students with lower scores
was that they "may help achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich
everyone's education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its
parts." Id. at 827.
56. See discussion infra Part II.
57. The three challenges include Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz. As a general
matter, few challenges have been filed considering the import of the issue. See,
e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128
(1995) (invalidating a race-based scholarship program tied to the admissions pro-
cess); Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551; Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d
1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001) (holding that universities
may constitutionally aim to achieve diverse student bodies).
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ticulated clear guidelines defining constitutionally permissible
affirmative action admission policies.
II. Supreme Court Guidelines For Constitutionally
Permissible Affirmative Actions Programs
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of
an affirmative action admission policy in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California at Davis v. Bakke.58 Allen Bakke, a white
male, charged that the University of California at Davis Medi-
cal School admissions policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause by granting preferential treatment in its admissions de-
cisions to applicants of color. 59 Bakke unsuccessfully applied for
admission to the University of California at Davis ("Davis")
Medical School in 1973 and 1974.60 He challenged the school's
1973 admission policy, adopted in an effort to diversify its en-
tering class, on the grounds that it operated to exclude him from
the school on the basis of his race. Bakke challenged the policy
as violating the Equal Protection Clause,61 the California Con-
58. 438 U.S. 265. See generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative
Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the
Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895 (1996).
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78.
60. Id. at 266. In 1973, Bakke received a benchmark score of 468/500, but his
application was late, and after his application was completed, no applicants in the
general admission pool were admitted with a score below 470/500. Id. at 276. At
that time four seats in the special admission program were open, although Mr.
Bakke was not considered for these seats. Id. Bakke wrote to the Associate Dean
and Chairman of the Admissions Committee, Dr. George H. Lowrey, to protest the
admissions quotas. Id. In 1974, Bakke applied early and received high marks
from a student interviewer, but received low marks from the faculty interviewer
who, coincidentally, was Dr. Lowrey. Id. at 277. Dr. Lowrey gave him his lowest
score of 86, making his total score 549/600 (there was one additional interviewer in
1974, so the total score was 600, as opposed to 500 in 1973). Id. at 277. Under the
special admission program, applicants were admitted with significantly lower cre-
dentials than Bakke. Id. at 277.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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stitution,62 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
v7).63
At the time, Davis employed a bifurcated admissions policy.
One committee considered non-minority applicants who had
achieved a minimum 2.5 undergraduate GPA ("UGPA").64 An-
other committee considered all minority candidates, regardless
of their objective scores. 65 The school set aside a certain num-
ber of seats for applicants in each of the groups.66 Individuals
from the general applicant pool could not fill seats from the mi-
nority applicant pool, even if seats were available.67 Bakke
claimed that the policy, which allowed the school to set aside a
certain number of places for minority applicants with lower ob-
62. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7, reads: "A citizen or class of citizens may not be
granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens.
Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or revoked."
63. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (West 2006),
reads: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance."
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
65. Id. at 274-75. Each applicant in the non-minority group was evaluated on
the basis of his or her UGPA, MCAT score, and observations made during a per-
sonal interview conducted by a member of the Admissions Committee. The Com-
mittee automatically rejected non-minority applicants whose UGPA fell below 2.5.
Id. at 273. In contrast, the committee referred minority student applications to a
Special Admissions Committee comprised mainly of members of minority groups.
This Committee rated minority applicants in a manner similar to the applicants in
the general applicant pool, except that a 2.5 UGPA did not serve as a ground for
summary rejection. Id. at 275. Thus, all minority applicants were considered for
admission by the Special Admissions Committee, regardless of their UGPA. Id.
With the exception of the minimum UGPA for non-minorities, students were eval-
uated for admissions based on the same general criteria. However, each of the two
Admissions Committees operated in a vacuum and did not compare its applicants
to the other applicant group. The Special Admissions Committee did not rate or
compare minority applicants to the non-minority applicants but could accept or
reject applicants based on failure to meet course requirements or other specific
deficiencies. The Special Admissions Committee continued to recommend appli-
cants until the number set by faculty vote were admitted. Id. at 273-75.
66. Id. at 275. In 1968, when the overall class size was fifty, the faculty set
aside eight seats for minorities. In 1971, the overall class size was expanded to
100, and in 1973, the number of seats set aside for minorities was expanded to
sixteen. Id.
67. Id. at 272-76. However, there was one special circumstance varying from
this rule. Id. at 276 n.6 (detailing a special circumstance).
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jective test scores than his own, was tantamount to a quota.68
The trial court found that Davis' admission policy was a racial
quota and held that it violated the California and United States
Constitutions, as well as Title VL. 69 The California Supreme
Court affirmed this holding. 70 Upon the State's appeal, the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari.71
The Supreme Court subjected the Davis policy to the strict
scrutiny test.72 According to the majority, "the Constitution
guarantees that when a program "touch[es] upon an individ-
ual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial deter-
mination that the burden he is asked to bear ...... is precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."73 Thus,
the Court wrote, the policy would be struck down unless UC
Davis could prove that there was a compelling governmental in-
terest in using a quota in the admissions process and that its
affirmative action admissions policy as drafted was narrowly
tailored to meet that interest.
Ultimately, the Court, in a highly fractionalized opinion,
struck down the Davis policy. Justice Powell wrote the majority
opinion,74 concluding that the Davis program violated both Title
VI and the Equal Protection Clause. 75 Applying the strict scru-
68. Id. at 277-78. When Davis rejected Bakke in 1973, four seats reserved for
applicants from the minority pool were unfilled, while the seats for the general
admission pool were filled. Id. at 266. Following the second rejection, Bakke sued
Davis and the Regents of the University of California in state court. Id.
69. Id. at 278-79. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court emphasized that
minority applicants in the program were rated only against one another and that
sixteen places out of the class of 100 were reserved exclusively for minorities. Id.
at 279.
70. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court ordered UC Davis to admit Bakke to the Medical School, since
the school was unable to demonstrate that he would not have been admitted in the
absence of the challenged program. Id. at 1172. Applying strict scrutiny, the court
concluded that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was
not the least intrusive means of achieving the school's compelling goals. Id. at
1167.
71. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 268, 281 (1978).
72. See Id. at 290-95.
73. Id. at 299 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
75. Id. at 271.
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tiny test,76 Justice Powell found that there was a compelling
governmental interest in attaining a diverse student body. 77 A
diverse student body contributing to a robust exchange of ideas,
he wrote, is a constitutionally permissible goal on which a race-
conscious university admissions program may be predicated. 78
However, although the Constitution does not bar admission pol-
icies from introducing race as a factor in the selection process,
Justice Powell concluded that the program was not narrowly
tailored, and that preferring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination on its
own.
7 9
The Davis admissions policy, which set aside a specific
number of seats for students in identified minority groups, un-
fairly benefited the interest of a victimized group at the expense
of other innocent individuals and, therefore, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.80 Additionally, its practice of having sepa-
76. Id. at 279. Justice Powell also wrote that "in order to justify the use of a
suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both consti-
tutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'nec-
essary... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."
Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)); see also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964).
77. Attainment of a diverse student body is related to academic freedom.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
78. Id. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence is widely believed to
be promoted by a diverse student body. Id. at 313-14.
79. Id. at 307 ("[w]e have never approved a classification that aids persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other inno-
cent individuals in the absence ofjudicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations."). Title VI clearly establishes that where
there is a need to overcome the effects of past racially discriminatory or exclusion-
ary practices engaged in by federally-funded institutions, race-conscious action is
required to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI. Id. at 307-09. Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with this, stating that "[Title VI]
does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedy-
ing past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 328 (Brennon, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 307. Justice Powell upheld the California Supreme Court's decision
that the special admissions program was unlawful, and that Bakke was to be ad-
mitted to Medical School; however, the Court reversed the decision enjoining the
Medical School from considering race in admissions. Id. at 324-25. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, in a concurring opinion,
agreed that the policy was unlawful because it unfairly favored one group over
another. Id. at 324-26. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun con-
curred in the holding and dissented in part, as they did not believe that Bakke
should be admitted to the Medical School or that quotas should be maintained. Id.
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rate admissions subcommittees review minority and non-minor-
ity candidates inappropriately insulated applicants from
comparison against the entire admissions pool.8 1 For these rea-
sons, Justice Powell concluded that the Davis admissions policy
was constitutionally impermissible.
Justice Powell's opinion acknowledged that the majority
viewed the Davis admissions policy as seeking to achieve a goal
that is of paramount importance to the fulfillment of its mission
and, in fact, as serving an important governmental interest.8 2
Justice Powell's opinion endorsed the policy of considering race
as a "plus" in instances where an affirmative action admissions
policy is free from clear goals or quotas.8 3 Indeed, a majority of
the Court recognized the University's right to select students
who would best contribute to the "robust exchange of ideas."8 4
However, "ethnic diversity.., is only one element in a range of
factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal
of a heterogeneous student body."8 5
at 379. They joined in Parts I and V-C, and White joined in part III-A. Id. at 328.
Along with Justice Powell, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun up-
held the use of race in the admissions process, while Justices Burger, Stevens,
Rehnquist, and Stewart considered the issue irrelevant to this case. See RON SIM-
MONS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION AFTER
Bakke, 1-2 (1982).
81. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 317. For example, assume two applicants, one minority and one
non-minority, have the same UGPA and MCAT scores. Under Justice Powell's
opinion, an admissions committee can offer admission to the minority applicant
before it offers admission to the non-minority applicant, since a diversity viewpoint
'plus" UGPA and MCAT score is of more value to the school than a non-diversity
viewpoint and the same "objective" test scores. For a discussion of the validity of
the "plus" factor rationale, see Krista L. Cosner, Affirmative Action in Higher Edu-
cation: Lessons and Directions from the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1004
(1996).
84. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.
85. Id. at 314. The Court acknowledged that the importance of diversity may
be greater at the undergraduate level than at the medical school level, where the
focus is on "professional competency," but concluded that the "contribution of di-
versity is substantial" even at this level, because doctors provide services to a "het-
erogeneous population." Id. at 313-14. The Court also noted that while law
schools focus on gaining legal skills and knowledge, this focus "cannot be effective
in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts."
Id. at 314 (internal quotation omitted). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens,
Stewart, and Rehnquist, joined in Justice Powell's conclusion that the program
was invalid, based on the conclusion that the program violated Title VI, and thus
there was no need to evaluate the program under the Equal Protection Clause.
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For nearly fifteen years following Bakke, the federal ap-
peals courts did not consider challenges to affirmative action
admission policies. In 1992, however, the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the first of several equal protection challenges, none of
which made it to the Supreme Court. These decisions all
hinged on the applicability of Justice Powell's majority decision.
The various circuits reached different conclusions on the prece-
dential value of Justice Powell's decision. In Hopwood v.
Texas,8 6 the Fifth Circuit concluded that Justice Powell's deci-
sion in Bakke was not binding on its court and that race could
not be considered as a factor in the admissions process.87
The Johnson Court considered an appeal from the District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia, which held that the
University of Georgia's ("UGA") policy of awarding a fixed nu-
merical bonus to non-white and male applicants, which it did
not give to white and female applicants, was unconstitutional.88
The majority concluded that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist joined in his
conclusion that the program was invalid, however, they did not consider the consti-
tutional issue since they concluded that the program violated Title VI. See gener-
ally, Id. at 408-22 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). However, while
not agreeing outright with Justice Powell's compelling "governmental interest"
definition, the plurality's acknowledgement of a university's right to achieve a het-
erogeneous student body suggests a tacit agreement. Of the Justices' lead opinion,
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun were in the minority, conclud-
ing that Title VI permits federally-funded entities to enact programs or policies
that assist minority groups to gain equal access to programs more easily available
to Caucasians. Id. at 324 (Brennon, J., dissenting). However, Title VI and the
Civil Rights Act do not take precedence over the constitutional protection of the
Equal Rights Clause, and thus such programs or policies are valid only to the ex-
tent that they are coterminous with the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, because
four Justices chose to limit the extent of their agreement with Justice Powell's
conclusion, Justice Powell's scrutiny of the Davis Policy under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause became, in a sense, a majority of one. Id.
86. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
87. See Id. A majority of the Fifth Circuit broadly ruled that the University of
Texas may not use race as a factor in law school admissions. Id. at 959. This
holding suggests that all schools in its jurisdiction were prohibited from doing the
same. Justice Powell's holding in Bakke was rejected by the majority, and found
not binding due to the fact that "no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion
discussing the diversity rationale." Id. at 944.
88. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga.
2000). On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, UGA argued that the school's policy
should be upheld because it was narrowly tailored to meet what Justice Powell
acknowledged in Bakke as a compelling governmental interest in admitting a di-
verse class. Id.
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was not binding under Marks v. United States, 9 which held
that "when a fragmented Court decides a case.., the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Mem-
bers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."90 Although the Court suggested that there could be a
compelling governmental interest,91 ultimately, the court struck
down UGA's policy as failing the narrowly tailored test.92
In Smith v. University of Washington Law School,93 how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit ruled Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
was binding on its court, 94 and that "the attainment of a diverse
student body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an insti-
tution of higher education." 95 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with
89. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
90. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
91. The Eleventh Circuit suggested there could be a compelling governmental
interest because of the government's demonstrated need for the program as a
means to eradicate present effects of past discrimination. Id. at 1252. Interest-
ingly, the court relied on a compelling governmental interest that justifies race
based policies in the work place. Id. The court disregarded Powell's stated compel-
ling governmental interest in a need for diversity in the classroom. Id. at 1252-53.
92. Id. at 1254.
93. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). The University of Washington Law School had used
race as a factor in its admissions policy from 1994-1998, until the school volunta-
rily complied with a State of Washington law that precluded schools from granting
preferential treatment to any individual on the basis of race. Id. at 1191.
94. The Ninth Circuit applied the analysis of Marks, which held that "the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in judgments on the narrowest grounds" is binding on the Court. Id. at
1199. Therefore, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding.
95. Id. at 1197. The Ninth Circuit went on to state that:
The district court correctly decided that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
described the law and would require a determination that a properly de-
signed and operated race-conscious admissions program at the Law School
of the University of Washington would not be in violation of Title VI or the
Fourteenth Amendment. It was also correct when it determined that Bakke
has not been overruled by the Supreme Court. Thus, at our level of the
judicial system, Justice Powell's opinion remains the law.
However, the Law School has encountered a peripeteia in its own state;
it is bound by 1-200, which precludes it from granting "preferential treat-
ment" to any individual "on the basis of race." That has rendered Smith's
request for prospective relief moot because we "[should] not assume that a
university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions
policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota
system. In short, good faith [should] be presumed in the absence of a show-
ing to the contrary . .. ."
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Hopwood when it reached a similar conclusion in Johnson v.
Board of Regents of the University of Georgia.96 The Johnson
majority concluded that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was
not binding;97 however, it was still willing to uphold the policy if
it passed the strict scrutiny test.98 The split among the circuits
made the issue ripe for Supreme Court review.
In 2003, twenty-five years after the Bakke case, the Su-
preme Court again considered the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action admission plans when it heard the twin cases of
Grutter v. Bolinger99 and Gratz v. Bolinger.100 Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, was filed by a Caucasian female and a Caucasian male,
each of whom were denied admission to the University of Michi-
gan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts ("LSA").101
Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher challenged LSA's admis-
sions policy, alleging that it improperly used race as a factor, in
violation of 42 USC §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 2
Barbara Grutter challenged the University of Michigan
School of Law's ("Law School") admissions policy as violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.103 At the time Grutter applied to the school, the Law
School used an admissions plan that allowed admissions offi-
cials to consider race as one of several factors that would lead
toward admission into the school. 10 4 Specifically, the policy re-
Id. at 1201 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19
(1978)).
96. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
97. The Eleventh Circuit relied on its findings in Marks, which held that
"when a fragmented Court decides a case . . .the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds." Id. at 1247. Applying a Marks-type analysis, the
Johnson court concluded, similarly to Hopwood, that Justice Powell's decision,
read with Justice Brennan's concurrence, supported the very narrow principle that
race could never be a factor in admissions policies. For these reasons, the Eleventh
Circuit clearly articulated its conclusion that Justice Powell's decision was not
binding on its court. Id. at 1247-48.
98. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
99. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
100. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
101. Id. at 251. The complaint was filed in October of 1997. Id. at 252.
102. Id. at 251-52.
103. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316-17; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. Id. at 318-21 (finding the Law School's plan "bears the hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored plan" by considering race a "'plus' factor" in admissions). Unlike
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quired those reviewing applications to consider each applicant
individually and to weigh a series of attributes including, Law
School Admission Score, undergraduate degree and grade point
average, race or ethnicity, work experience, years out of law
school, etc.105 Given the propensity for minority applicants to
perform less well on the LSAT, the policy allowed admissions
officials to treat race as a "plus" in an effort to admit a more
critically diverse class. 10 6
Grutter challenged the program in federal court, arguing
that the law school used race as a predominant factor, which
gave members of a minority group a significantly greater
chance of admission than a non-minority student with the same
credentials. 10 7 Grutter also alleged that the law school had no
compelling reason that would justify the use of race. 08 The dis-
trict court agreed with Grutter that the use of race was unlaw-
ful, because the Law School did not have a compelling interest
in increasing the racial balance of its entering class and the use
of race was not narrowly tailored. 10 9 The Court of Appeals sit-
ting en banc reversed, holding that there was a compelling state
interest in admitting a diverse entering class and that the Law
School's plan, which allowed committee members to treat race
as a "plus," was narrowly tailored to meet that goal." 0
the system utilized by the Law School, Michigan's undergraduate admissions pro-
gram assigned a point value to factors. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253-54. However, the
Supreme Court found that race was assigned such a high point value that it was a
decisive factor in the undergraduate admissions policy instead of just one of many
factors considered. Id. at 272.
105. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (noting factors in admission includes fluency in
foreign languages, overcoming personal adversity and family hardship, extensive
community service, unusual intellectual achievement, employment experience,
nonacademic experience, and personal background).
106. Id. at 318.
107. Id. at 317.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 321.
110. Id. In Grutter, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, Southern Division, subjected the Law School's admissions policy to
strict scrutiny. Id. at 321. The court concluded that Justice Powell's majority
opinion in Bakke was not binding, and therefore the Law School's mission of ad-
mitting a diverse class was not a compelling governmental interest to justify in-
cluding race in the list of non-objective factors that could contribute to an
applicant's success. Id. The district court further found that the admissions policy
was not narrowly tailored, concluding that the Law School's goal of admitting a
"critical mass" was practically indistinguishable from a quota, and was such an
20061
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Concurrent with Grutter's court challenge, Jennifer Gratz
and Patrick Hamacher challenged LSA's admissions policy, ar-
guing that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Consti-
tution."1 Between 1995 and 2000, LSA revised its admission's
amorphous figure that a program could never be narrowly tailored to achieve it.
Id. Judge Friedman issued an injunction prohibiting the Law School from consid-
ering race in its admissions policy. Id. In response to the district court decision,
the Law School petitioned the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit heard the Grutter
appeal en banc on the same day as Gratz. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 259
(2003).
The main issues before the Sixth Circuit were whether the district court erred
in concluding that Justice Powell's opinion was not binding and, if so, whether the
Law School's admissions policy passed constitutional muster under Powell's rea-
soning in Bakke. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321. As to the first issue, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the district court improperly applied a Marks analysis to the plural-
ity opinion in Bakke. Id. In Bakke, Justice Brennan's concurrence, which was
joined by three other Justices, signaled his agreement with Justice Powell that
diversifying a student body could be a compelling governmental interest. Grutter
v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 742-43 (6th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the court found
that its subsequent treatment of Bakke, in cases like Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
F.C.C., supports the conclusion that Powell's position in Bakke represents the
holding of the case. Id. at 743. Justice Martin held that since, under a Marks
analysis, Justice Powell's decision in Bakke is binding on the courts, it should re-
main the law until the Supreme Court expressly overrules it. Id. at 744.
Once the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court misapplied controlling
law, it considered whether, under Bakke, the Law School's admissions policy was
narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest of admitting a di-
verse entering class. Id. at 746-47. The court recognized that the Law School's
admissions policy closely tracked the Harvard Plan, which the Bakke Court sug-
gested would pass strict scrutiny. Id. at 747. Specifically, the Law School policy
did not use quotas, only considered race, ethnicity, and other soft variables as po-
tential "plus" factors in an applicant's file, and read and evaluated each applicant
individually. Id. For these reasons, it was narrowly tailored. The court further
considered the school's policy of weekly reviews of the race and ethnicity of the
admitted applicants. Id. The goal of this practice, according to the Law School,
was to ensure that the school enrolled a "critical mass" of underrepresented minor-
ity students, so that a few wouldn't feel isolated or as though they must be the
spokesperson for an entire group of people. Id. Enrolling a critical mass, the Law
School offer, ensured that the entire class would obtain the benefits of an academi-
cally diverse student body. Id. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit Court was satisfied
that a "critical mass" did not equal a quota, and the court upheld the Law School's
admissions policy. Id.
The petitioners from the Grutter case filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court following the Sixth Circuit decision. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2002). The
Court granted certiorari on December 2, 2002. The Gratz petitioners also asked
the Court to grant certiorari, even though the Sixth Circuit had not yet rendered
an opinion in that case, so that the Court could address the constitutionality of
affirmative action admissions policies "in a wider range of circumstances." Gratz,
539 U.S. at 260.
111. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249-50.
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policy on several occasions. 112 Essentially, the admissions pol-
icy allotted a point value, called a SCUGA113 score, to certain
factors, including high school GPA, standardized test scores, ge-
ography, alumni relationships, quality of high school, etc."14
Additionally, the policy allotted points for the unique character-
istics of an applicant. 1 5 The school combined the SCUGA score
with a student's SAT and GPA. An applicant's total score deter-
mined whether the committee would read the application. The
district court found that LSA had a compelling interest in
achieving a diverse student body, and the admissions program
between 1999 and 2000 was narrowly tailored.1 6 The court of
appeals did not consider the constitutionality of LSA's admis-
sion program." 7
Both cases made their way to the Supreme Court and were
decided on the same day, June 23, 2003.118 Because these were
challenges to racial-preference policies, the Supreme Court sub-
jected both to strict scrutiny. 119 Thus, the Court could only up-
hold the policy if the proponents demonstrated that the
112. Id. at 254-57.
113. "SCUGA" is an acronym with letters signifying "the quality of an appli-
cant's high school (S), the strength of an applicant's high school curriculum (C), an
applicant's unusual circumstances (U), an applicant's geographical residence (G),
and an applicant's alumni relationships (A)." Id. at 254.
114. See Id.
115. See Id. In 1995-97, these unique characteristics were termed "an appli-
cant's unusual circumstances." Id. at 254-55. For 1995 and 1996, minority appli-
cants were rated based upon a different scale than non-minority applicants, but in
1997 the minority status was allotted a higher point value under the "unusual
circumstances" category. Id. at 255. In 1998, the points for such unique character-
istics were allotted under categories such as "personal achievement or leadership"
and "miscellaneous," which included "membership in an underrepresented racial
or ethnic minority group." Id. Finally, in 1999 and 2000, the LSA added an addi-
tional procedure that allowed for applicants to be "flagged" for further review. Id.
at 256. In 1998-2000, twenty points on a 150 point scale, were awarded for "mem-
bership in an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group." Id. at 255-56.
116. Id. at 258. For a discussion on the different admissions policies, see
supra text accompanying note 34.
117. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 259-60.
118. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 244 (2003).
119. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. See Leslie Yalof Gar-
field, Back to Bakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Poli-
cies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. REV. 631 (2005)
(discussing the new strict scrutiny test).
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program was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling govern-
mental interest. 120
In each case, the Court held that there was a compelling
governmental interest in achieving a diverse classroom; 12' and
for that reason, any program aimed at achieving a diverse en-
tering class would pass the compelling governmental interest
prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court differed, however, in
whether the two programs were narrowly tailored. In Gratz,
the Court struck down LSA's affirmative action admission pro-
gram, holding that it was not narrowly tailored because it gave
points, wholesale, to a class of individuals and did not allow for
individual review in a meaningful way that would assess
whether a particular applicant would contribute to a diverse
setting. 22 In Grutter, however, the Court upheld the law
school's program, ruling that its policy of requiring admissions
committee members to individually assess each application was
narrowly tailored.123 The individual review process ensured
that an applicant was not admitted solely based on membership
in a particular class, but instead, was admitted because his or
her race or ethnicity was one of several factors that might con-
tribute to creating a well-rounded entering class with robust
discussion. 24
120. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
121. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-76.
122. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-76. The Supreme Court upheld Justice Powell's
explanation that universities could use race as a "plus" factor. Id. at 270 (quoting
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)). However, the Court
also re-emphasized the "importance of considering each particular applicant as an
individual, assessing all of the qualities that individuals possess, and in turn, eval-
uating that individual's ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher educa-
tion." Id. Then, the Court found that the University's policy of distributing twenty
of 150 points to an applicant based upon qualifying as an "underrepresented mi-
nority" did not provide for the individualized review required by Bakke. Id. at 271-
72. The Court found the awarding of points made race the "decisive" factor for
"virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant." Id. at
272.
123. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-44.
124. Id. The Court found that the Law School plan bears the 'hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored plan[,]" because it used race as a "'plus' factor in the context of
individualized review of each and every applicant." Id. at 334. The Court de-
scribed the Law School's plan as "highly individualized, holistic review of each ap-
plicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might
contribute to a diverse educational environment." Id. at 337.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist provided the majority opinion in
the Gratz decision. 125 Writing for the majority, 126 Chief Justice
Rehnquist found that the fatal flaw in the University's admis-
sions policy was its failure to provide individual review of each
candidate. 27 LSA's policy of automatically distributing twenty
points to every applicant from the "underrepresented minority"
applicant pool had the result of treating race as an absolute,
"which could jettison a member of an underrepresented group
into the accept category, regardless of the experiences or quali-
ties that race had contributed to the development of the individ-
ual." 28 LSA's admission policy went beyond the spirit of Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, that race could be considered a factor
in the admissions policy since it failed to allow for interpreta-
tion of "individual qualities or experiences not dependant upon
race but sometimes associated with it."129
Under LSA's policy, admissions officials individually re-
viewed applications but only if the application got a high
enough SCUGA score. The majority found this policy flawed
since the individual review was only provided after admissions
counselors automatically assigned points to a candidate. 30
They rejected the LSA's concern that the volume of applications
made it impractical to use an admissions system primarily
125. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
126. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined the Court's ma-
jority opinion.
127. Id. at 271. "[The Court finds] that the University's current policy, which
automatically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee
admission, to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of
race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity." Id. at 270.
128. Id. at 270-71. LSA's policy went beyond the spirit of Justice Powell's
edict that race can be considered a factor in admissions, since it failed to allow for
interpretation of "individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but
sometimes associated with it." Id. at 272-73. The Court held that the possibility of
committee review, "is of little comfort under our strict scrutiny analysis." Id. at
274. There was not enough information in the record to know how many appli-
cants were actually "flagged" but the Court felt that it was undisputed that the
individual consideration was "the exception and not the rule." Id. at 274. It also
did not satisfy strict scrutiny because the individualized review of the committee
only occurred after LSA distributed "the University's version of a 'plus' that makes
race a decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented mi-
nority applicant." Id.
129. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
324 (1978)).
130. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72
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based on individual review, and thus automatic assignment was
the only means to efficiently consider the volume of applicants
it received each year.131 In response, the Court wrote, "the fact
that the implementation of a program capable of providing indi-
vidualized consideration might present administrative chal-
lenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic
system."132
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor wrote that LSA's
practice of assigning points to applicants merely because they
are members of a particular class precluded the committee from
considering the particular applicant's ability to contribute to
meaningful class discussion. 133 Under LSA's policy, "under-
represented minority" status granted the applicant such a sig-
nificant number or points that it had the effect of almost
guaranteeing acceptance to the school, rather than serving as a
contributing factor in the decision making process. 34 Justice
O'Connor found that the policy, which she defined as a "non-
individualized mechanical system" 35 was flawed and therefore
unconstitutional.
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, found LSA's pol-
icy flawed because "it awards all underrepresented minorities
the same racial preference."136 The system of automatically as-
signing points failed to afford admissions counselors the ability
131. Id. at 275.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 277-80 (O'Conner, J.,. concurring). LSA's automatic award of
points did not satisfy the requirement of providing individualized consideration.
Id. This is in contrast to the Law School's program, which O'Connor held constitu-
tional because each application was read completely and considered individually
and therefore race was only used as a "plus." Id.
134. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that an applicant could acquire a signifi-
cant number of points through the other factors in the applicant's SCUGA score,
but noted that the points assigned for those other categories were significantly
lower than those assigned for race. Id. at 279. Consequently, "[elven the most
outstanding national high school leader could never receive more than five points
for his or her accomplishments-a mere quarter of the points automatically as-
signed to an underrepresented minority solely based on the fact of his or her race."
Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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to identify and consider what viewpoints an applicant might
bring to the classroom.13 7
The various majority opinions in Gratz clearly endorsed the
notion that seeking a critical mass of diverse viewpoints in the
classroom serves a compelling governmental interest. However,
race in and of itself did not dictate the viewpoint that an indi-
vidual might bring to the classroom. In order to ensure this,
admissions officials needed to evaluate the voice that each ap-
plicant would bring to the classroom. Such a voice is not auto-
matically determined based on race. Thus, anything short of an
individual evaluation of an applicant's history, past exper-
iences, and other factors that might contribute to his or her val-
ues and opinions, would fall short of being narrowly tailored. 138
In Grutter v. Bolinger, a divided Court upheld the Law
School's admissions policy. 39 The Court first reaffirmed past
decisions, which found a compelling governmental interest in
admitting a diverse entering class.' 40 Furthermore, the Court
found that the Law School's policy was narrowly tailored to
meet that interest since it allowed members of the admissions
committee to individually review each applicant in a way that
137. Id. at 281. Ultimately, Justice Thomas would have gone further than his
brethren and perhaps (given his opinion) even overruled Bakke. Id. According to
Justice Thomas, "a State's use of racial discrimination in higher education admis-
sions is categorically prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
138. Those dissenting believed that the program was, in fact, narrowly tai-
lored to meet the strict scrutiny test. Justice Souter would have likely upheld
LSA's policy. Id. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting). Noting the holdings in Bakke and
Grutter, Justice Souter wrote that the Court has acknowledged that there is a com-
pelling governmental interest in achieving diversity and that race can be consid-
ered a plus in the admissions process in order to achieve that diversity. Awarding
value requires a school to consider race in a way that increases the applicant's
chances of acceptance. Id. at 295. Justice Ginsburg's dissent focused more on the
need to correct past inequality than it did on the need for diversity in the class-
room. Id. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She wrote, "[tihe stain of generations
of racial oppression is still visible in our society." Id. at 304. As a result, there is a
compelling need for such policies and wide latitude should be given when inter-
preting whether the policies are narrowly tailored. Id. at 303. Therefore, Justice
Ginsburg found "no constitutional infirmity." Id.
139. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Id. at 310. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in part. Id.
140. Id. at 322-32.
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considered race and ethnicity among a host of diversity
factors. 141
The majority reaffirmed Justice Powell's conclusion in
Bakke that achieving diversity in education supports a compel-
ling governmental interest. 142 "Skills needed in today's increas-
ingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to a widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and view-
points." 143 Thus, the school's articulated compelling govern-
mental interest transcends the classroom to society as a
whole.144
Once the majority concluded that the Law School's program
met the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict
scrutiny test, it turned its attention to whether the program
was narrowly tailored. The ideal policy, according to the major-
ity, would be "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each appli-
cant and place them on the same footing for consideration, al-
though not necessarily according them the same weight.' 145
The Law School's policy of considering race or ethnicity as only
one of many equal factors that could contribute to making an
applicant qualified for admission to the law school made the
program sufficiently flexible. 146 Recalling the language of many
141. Id. at 334-35.
142. Id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, observed, that in the
Court's view, "attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's
proper institutional mission, and that 'good faith' on the part of a university is
'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary."' Id. at 333. The Law School prop-
erly articulated a compelling governmental interest, by stating in its mission state-
ment the need to admit a "critical mass" in order to assemble a class that is
broadly diverse. Id. at 328-30. Justice O'Connor stated that the benefits from di-
versity "are substantial," as shown by the District Court. Id. Achieving diversity
helps promote "cross-racial understanding," breaks down stereotypes, and lets stu-
dents better understand people from other races. Id. at 328-32. These benefits of
diversity were also asserted by the amicus curiae, including major American busi-
nesses, and high-ranking retired officers and civilian officials from the United
States Military. Id. at 331-32.
143. Id. at 331. The Court also adopted the military's conclusion that "a
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's abil-
ity to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security." Id.
144. Id. at 331-32.
145. Id. at 334 (internal quotation omitted).
146. Id. at 337-42. Justice O'Connor found significant similarities between
the Law School's policy and the Harvard Plan, to which Justice Powell referred in
Bakke as constitutionally permissible. Id. at 334-40. Both plans adequately en-
[Vol. 27:15
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of its earlier strict scrutiny cases, the Court considered whether
the Law School policy was the least restrictive means to achieve
its goals. Indeed, any policy that gives some sort of preferential
treatment to a particular category of persons would be less than
ideal and one could always speculate that there are more re-
strictive alternatives to achieving the goal of a diverse class-
room. 147 To be sure, while the Court recognized that one might
be able to hypothesize alternatives to the Law School's policy,
the policy before the Court met the strict scrutiny test. 148 Jus-
tice O'Connor, writing for the majority, concluded that narrowly
tailored "does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative."149
The Court next turned its attention to whether the Law
School policy's mission of seeking a "critical mass" would mean
that the policy was too broad in scope to be narrowly tailored.
The Court's dissenters argued that the goal of seeking a "critical
mass" was really nothing more than a disguised quota. 150 The
majority disagreed, and ultimately concluded that the program
was sufficiently narrowly tailored and therefore passed the
strict scrutiny test.15' Ultimately, the Court was sufficiently
sure that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaning-
fully considered alongside race in admissions decisions. Id. Neither the Harvard
Plan, nor the Law School's admissions policy, identified either race or ethnicity as
the single characteristic that would ensure diversity. Id.
147. See generally id. at 341.
148. Id. at 337-41. The Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the school
had considered race-neutral alternatives. Id. at 339-40. The district court had
proposed race-neutral alternatives like using a lottery system, decreasing the
school's reliance on grades and test scores, or automatically admitting a certain
percentage from each high-school. Id. at 340. The Court rejected these alterna-
tives; the lottery system would not work because it precluded the individualized
review that is required. Id. Requiring the Law School to lower its standards
would be to drastically change the school and require it to sacrifice a vital part of
its educational mission. Id. Automatically admitting a certain top percentage of
each high school class would also not work because they also precluded individual-
ized review and the Court did not understand how it could be applied to graduate
level schools. Id.
149. Id. at 339.
150. See generally id. at 374-75 n.12. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas dissented.
151. "The Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented
minority students does not transform its program into a quota." Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-37 (2003). "[Tlhere is of course 'some relationship between
numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and
between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students ad-
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convinced that the Law School had adopted a workable and con-
stitutionally permissible program. 152
III. The Challenge of Meeting the Supreme Court's
Affirmative'Action Ideal
Grutter and Gratz create a blueprint for constructing an af-
firmative action admissions policy that would withstand an
mitted.' 'Some attention to numbers,' without more, does not transform a flexible
admissions system into a rigid quota." Id. at 336 (internal citation omitted).
152. While the Court found that a policy that considers race or ethnicity as
one factor among several factors to be narrowly tailored, it expressed its concern
that schools continue to use such policies ad infinitum. Id. at 342. "In the context
of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in
race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews .. " Id. Justice O'Connor
wrote that the Court "expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial prefer-
ences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." Id. at
343.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy each filed a
separate opinion in which they concurred in part and dissented in part. Both Jus-
tice Thomas and Justice Scalia's opinions suggest that they would never uphold an
admissions policy that granted racial preferences. Id. at 347-49 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part) and 349-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Justice Thomas con-
curred with that part of the Court's holding which he interpreted to require "that
racial discrimination in higher education admissions would be illegal in 25 years."
Id. at 351. He disagreed, however, with the Court's decision to uphold the Law
School's compelling interest in maintaining a diverse entering class. Id. Thomas
looked at the Law School's policy from a pragmatic standpoint. The Law School's
need to use race as a plus in admissions was derived from its desire to admit an
elite entering class. Id. As a general matter, non-minority students significantly
outperformed underrepresented minorities on objective tests, hence the need for
the "plus" in the admissions policy. Id. at 369-70. If, however, the Law School
chose to admit a majority of the student body with objective test scores, it would
not need to give underrepresented minorities a "plus" in the admissions process.
Id. at 378. There is no compelling state interest in having an elite Law School, and
for this reason the policy should have been struck down Chief Justice Rehnquist in
his dissent provided little guidance toward what he thought the Law School could
have done to make the process narrowly tailored. Id. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). He paid careful attention to the relationship between the number of
underrepresented minority students who applied to the Law School, and the num-
ber who were accepted. According to the Chief Justice, "the correlation between
the percentage of the Law School's pool of applicants who are members of the three
minority groups, and the percentage of the admitted applicants who are members
of these same groups, is far too precise to be dismissed as merely the result of the
school paying 'some attention to [the] numbers.'" Id. at 383. The mathematical
precision, in which Justice Rehnquist believed the Law School engaged, was prob-
lematic as it was tantamount to a quota. Id. at 383-86. For this reason, Rehnquist
would have struck down the law school program. See Garfield, supra note 119, at
670-71.
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equal protection challenge. 153 Under these most recent cases, a
court will find a compelling governmental interest in adopting a
race-based admissions policy whose mission includes admitting
a critical mass of underrepresented minorities. 54 A court will
also likely conclude that a program meets the narrowly tailored
prong of the test if it provides for meaningful individual review
of applicants. 155
Precedent confirms that a policy identical to that of the
Law School's is the constitutional ideal. Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the majority in Grutter found that the individual review
process of the Law School program ensured that an applicant's
admission was not based predominately on membership in a
particular class. 156 The Gratz majority essentially endorsed the
Grutter plan by holding that anything short of individual review
of applicants against all other applicants would fail a constitu-
tional challenge. 157 Thus, administrators and admissions offi-
cials at post-secondary schools need only adopt the Law School
model to insulate their institutions from future constitutional
challenges. Even the Court acknowledged that the Law School
model is not easily attainable for schools that receive a signifi-
cantly large number of applications 158 in any given academic
year.159 The challenge, therefore, is for large educational insti-
tutions to create an affirmative action admission policy that
mimics a model that was created for a relatively small graduate
institution.
At the outset, colleges and universities would be well ad-
vised to adopt a mission statement to support their affirmative
153. See Garfield, supra note 119, at 679-83, (discussing the "new" strict scru-
tiny test the Court developed for reviewing affirmative action admission
programs).
154. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
155. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309.
156. Garfield, supra note 119, at 677.
157. Id. at 684.
158. The Law School receives more than 3,500 applications and admits ap-
proximately 350 students annually. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-313. LSA receives
roughly 15,000 first-year applications every year and admits approximately 9,400
students. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN COLLEGE OF LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND THE
ARTS PROFILE 3 (2005), http://www.lsa.umich.eduUofM/Content/lsa/document/
LSAprofile2006.pdf.
159. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
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action admission policies. The Law School's mission statement
identifying its goal to "promote and enhance classroom discus-
sion both inside and outside the classroom by admitting stu-
dents with perspectives that vary from those that have not
experienced historic educational discrimination"160 clearly satis-
fied the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict
scrutiny test.161 Thus, schools could adopt a mission statement
with identical language and know that they are fairly likely to
succeed in showing a compelling governmental interest. 62
The absence of a mission statement will not preclude a
court's finding of a compelling governmental interest if the de-
fending school can demonstrate that its policy is intended to ob-
tain diversity in the classroom. LSA did not offer the Court an
identifiable mission statement. 63 Even so, the Gratz Court con-
cluded that given Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, an affirma-
tive action admission policy could meet the compelling
governmental interest prong since there is great educational
value in a robust exchange of diverse ideas. 64 A declaration of
160. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319.
When asked about the policy's "commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with
special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been histori-
cally discriminated against," Lempert explained that this language did not purport
to remedy past discrimination, but rather to include students who may bring to the
Law School a perspective different from that of members of groups which have not
been the victims of such discrimination. Lempert acknowledged that other groups,
such as Asians and Jews, have experienced discrimination, but explained they
were not mentioned in the policy because individuals who are members of those
groups were already being admitted to the Law School in significant numbers.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
161. Id. at 329-31. The mission statement notes a "commitment to racial and
ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups
that have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispan-
ics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented
in our student body in meaningful numbers." Memorandum of Law in Support of
Renewed Motion By Defendants Bollinger, Lehman, and Shields for Summary
Judgment on the Grounds of Qualified Immunity at *2, Grutter v. Bollinger, Civ.
No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2000), available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.
edu/admissions/legal/grutter/rmqigru03.html. (last visited September 25, 2006).
162. See Id.
163. See generally Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiffs' Claims for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at *6, Gratz v. Bollinger,
Civ. No. 97-75231 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2000), available at http://www.vpcomm.
umich.edu/admissions/legal/gratz/drmgz06.html (last visited September 25, 2006)
(discussing LSA's position on its policies pertaining to student body diversity).
164. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-71 (2003).
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intent on the part of the school, however, would make any con-
stitutional challenge easier to survive.
The other requirement for constitutionally permissible af-
firmative action admission programs is the need for individual
review of applicants. 165 The Gratz majority rejected LSA's ad-
missions policy because of its failure to look at each applicant
and what he or she might contribute to the classroom. 166 Ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, Bakke required schools to con-
sider each applicant's "individual qualities or experiences,"
'16 7
including race. A meaningful, individualized review of each ap-
plication was the only way to assure compliance with the
Court's rule of law.
Under the Gratz and Grutter Courts' edicts, however, a
school may continue to automatically reject or automatically ad-
mit168 candidates, alleviating an admissions office of individual
review of every application. The automatic reject/admit prac-
tice is a means to decrease the number of applications that a
school's admission office must spend time reviewing. This prac-
tice is clearly necessary given the "volume of applications,"
which makes it "impractical to review each applicant
individually". 169
Under this program, a school sets certain objective num-
bers for an applicant's SATs and UGPA which would assure
them acceptance or rejection to the school.1 70 Thus, for in-
165. See supra text accompanying note 133.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 127 and 128.
167. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272. See also supra text accompanying note 128.
168. Students may be admitted or rejected by a clerk without counselor re-
view if grades and test scores are above or below certain standards. See Defend-
ants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at
14, n.6, Gratz v. Bollinger, Civ. No. 97-75231 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 1999), available
at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal]gratz/gzsumfnt.html (last vis-
ited September 25, 2006). LSA states that the "'automatic admit' process relates
only to the timing of when clerks caused certain applicants to be informed of ad-
missions decisions . . . ." Moreover, although clerks were able to reject candidates
with low grades and test scores without counselor review, the process was not uti-
lized because clerks were uncomfortable rejecting students without counselor re-
view. Id.
169. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275. See supra text accompanying note 29.
170. The increasing importance to a school's reputation based on its U.S.
News & World Report ranking has, arguably, increased schools' use of automatic
accept/reject categories. U.S. News & World Report credits a school's student se-
lectivity with 15% of the weight in ranking schools. This 15% is also weighted,
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stance, the 2005 Fiske Guide, one of the leading guide books on
American colleges and universities, reports that students ad-
mitted to the Washington University of St. Louis, an elite pri-
vate institution in St. Louis, Missouri, had a mean verbal SAT
score range between 640 and 730 and a mean math SAT score
range between 670 and 750.171 Most students were also in the
top 10 percent of their class, or had a UGPA of approximately
3.6.172 Hypothetically, Washington University would automati-
cally reject an applicant who submits objective scores of a 2.5
GPA173 and an 1100 SAT, which is below the school's mean
numbers. Presumably, someone with these scores does not pre-
sent a profile similar to a large portion of the school's entering
class and would, therefore, be unable to compete academi-
cally.174 In contrast, the school might automatically admit an
applicant who submits an SAT score of 1600 and a UGPA score
of 4.0, well above that same mean. Schools need only review all
applications that fall between the automatic accept and auto-
matic reject categories.
The Grutter and Gratz decisions provide clear guidelines
for schools to follow. Any institute of higher education inter-
ested in meeting the Court's affirmative action admission policy
need merely identify as its mission the goal of admitting a di-
verse entering class. The school must also ensure that it re-
views applicants even-handedly, providing individualized
with 50% of selectivity derived from SAT scores, 40% from GPA, and 10% from
acceptance rate. Robert J. Morse & Samuel Flanigan, Using the Rankings, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 2006, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/arti-
cles/brief/06rank brief_2.php. In an effort to climb up in the rankings, therefore,
schools are increasingly limiting the number of admitted students with SATs be-
low their desired mean. See Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Mat-
ter? The Effects of U.S. News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process
of Law Schools, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105 (2006); see also Amanda Griffith & Kevin
Rask, The Influence of the U.S. News and World Report Collegiate Rankings on the
Matriculation Decision of High-Ability Students: 1995-2003 (Aug. 2004) (unpub-
lished comment), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=595223; but see Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News and World Report Law
School Rankings are Both Useful and Important, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 487, 492-93
(2001).
171. EDWARD B. FISKE, FisKE GUIDE TO COLLEGES 703 (2d. ed. 2005).
172. Id. (3.6 average on a 4.0 scale is considered an A average).
173. A 2.5 on a 4.0 scale is equal to a C+ average.
174. A student with a UGPA of 4.0 and SAT score of 1600 would presumably
be admitted to an institution with these scores, but selective schools are not likely
to have an automatic admit category.
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review of any applicant who is not accepted based on objective
criteria.
The seemingly attainable policy outlined by the Supreme
Court is inherently flawed, particularly for larger institutions.
Those with multitudinous applicants do not have the luxury of
time for individual review. 175 LSA's concern that individual re-
view of a large applicant pool is an unattainable goal is a well
founded one. For its 2006 entering freshman class, the Univer-
sity of Michigan received 25,733 applications for its undergrad-
uate program and accepted 12,196 applicants. 176 Even small
institutions are deluged with applicants. Bucknell University,
a small liberal arts school with approximately 3,000 students,
received 9000 applications for 915 spots. 177 Individual review of
these applications is costly, time consuming and a potential
drain of admissions office administrative resources.
To alleviate individual review of all applicants, many grad-
uate and post-graduate institutions with significant numbers of
applicants quietly use automatic admit/reject categories. 78 The
only constitutional limitation on the practice of setting ceilings
and floors is that the automatic reject and automatic admit cat-
egories remain race-neutral. 79 Assuming one were to accept
the premise that African-Americans and other minority groups
score lower on the SATs,' 80 an automatic reject/accept policy
with a narrow band of applicants for review would eliminate a
disproportionate number of minority applicants. In order to as-
sure a larger applicant pool, schools must lower the automatic
reject category, thereby increasing the number of minority ap-
175. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
176. University of Michigan Undergraduate Admissions, Fast Facts, http:l!
www.admissions.umich.edu/fastfacts.html (last visited September 12, 2006).
177. Letter from Mark Davies, Director of Admissions, Bucknell University,
(Mar. 28, 2006) (on file with author).
178. Sixth Annual APPAM Admissions Directors Meeting Looks at Policies
and Procedures in the Admissions Process, APPAM NEWS (Ass'n for Pub. Policy
Analysis & Mgmt., Wash., D.C.), Summer/Fall 2005, at 2, available at http://www.
appam.org/news/newsletter/appam-summer-fall-05.pdf.
179. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (holding
the use of setting aside a specific number of class seats based on race or ethnicity is
a quota); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273 (rejecting as unconstitutional LSA's practice of
automatically awarding points to underrepresented minorities to improve the like-
lihood of admittance).
180. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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plicants in the individual review category. This widened band
of reviewable applicants will mean that admissions offices will
need to dedicate more time and resources to their review
process.
Automatic admit/reject categories, however, are problem-
atic to the affirmative action cause. Ironically, reliance on ob-
jective factors prompted the need for affirmative action in the
first place, since admissions programs based on objective factors
failed to yield a diverse entering class.' 8 ' Now, almost forty
years after the affirmative action seeds were first sown, the
Grutter and Gratz decisions, in some ways, place admissions of-
fices back at square one.
The easy response to meeting the demands of the Court's
constitutional requirements is to merely increase the number of
admissions officers reading each application. 8 2 Ideally, each
school's office would be fully staffed with individuals capable
and in a position to provide a full review to every applicant. But
adding admissions officers is not necessarily practical. Such a
decision would require a school to dedicate significant funding
for additional personnel. 8 3 The cost of such funding would
most likely be passed to the consumer, which is the applicant. 8 4
181. See supra text accompanying note 18.
182. Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative Action, Race, and the Constitution: From
Bakke to Grutter, 92 Ky. L.J. 219, 238-39 (2003).
183. For example, Pace Law School a small, private New York law school re-
ceives over 3200 applications each year for approximately 250 spots. The eight
members of the admissions committee consider approximately 1100 applications
each year. The remainder are rejected or accepted based on the Admissions Direc-
tor's decision. Applications are read over a period of five months. A school wishing
to offer committee review to the widest possible number of applicants to assure the
most diverse entering class, would most likely have to review almost twice as
many applications, assuming the automatic accept category remained the same.
In order to meet this need, the admissions staffwould need to double. A 100% staff
expansion would necessitate a 100% increase in the admissions office's personnel
budget. Telephone Interview with Lisa Lancia, Associate Director of Admissions,
Pace Law School, in White Plains, NY (Apr. 11, 2006).
184. The courts have recognized that there are significant educational bene-
fits that stem from diversity and raised these benefits to the level of a compelling
government interest. At the same time however, the strict "narrowly tailored" re-
quirement will require schools to spend a significant amount of money on staff to
review applications as a result of the requirement of individualized review of all
applications. In light of the significant benefits that diversity provides to the stu-
dents, the schools, the American military, American businesses and the country as
a whole, the government should assist schools financially to ensure that affirma-
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Given the need for additional personnel, the question be-
comes, who should bear the financial responsibility of meeting
the demands of Grutter? Ideally, those who are benefiting from
the product (the review of applications) should bear the cost of
meeting the Constitutional mandate. By passing along the cost
of individual review to the applicant, however, the gatekeeper is
effectively closing the gate in front of those whom it seeks to
admit. Since many of the applicants that affirmative action ad-
mission programs seek to benefit are socio-economically disad-
vantaged, such a policy would actually have a chilling effect on
the applicants that schools are trying to admit in their effort to
reach a critical mass of diversity in the classroom.
A different solution to the problem posed by Grutter might
be to pass the cost of the additional admissions counselors on to
those admitted to the school.'8 5 Clearly, the Court holds ideal
any learning that is conducted in a classroom of diverse view-
points.8 6 Since training through diverse voices has the poten-
tial to benefit innocent third parties in the classroom, the value
is equal for all students regardless of race or ethnicity. 8 7 By
passing the cost on to students who are admitted to a school
with a constitutionally permissible affirmative action admis-
sions policy, the school will be charging them for something of
value.
Raising the cost of tuition is also potentially chilling to
those who are not in a position to financially afford higher edu-
cation. Today, most private institutions cost in excess of
$40,000 per year. 88 Arguably, the students that affirmative ac-
tion admission policies seek to admit, with educationally disad-
vantaged backgrounds, often come from lower socio-economic
classes.'8 9 It is these students for whom higher tuition costs
will be most problematic.
tive action programs can be maintained that provide the required level of review
and scrutiny of all applicants.
185. This could be done through a tuition hike.
186. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978); Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 292
(2003). Indeed, the Court has recognized that there is a societal benefit. See supra
text accompanying note 143.
187. Garfield, supra note 58, at 914.
188. See generally FisKE, supra note 171.
189. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disad-
vantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1925-27 (1996).
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To be fair, the Supreme Court did not require full individ-
ual review for each applicant and consequently the need for an
increased admissions staff might not be as urgent as is posited.
Schools could adopt a two-tiered review process. Under this
process, admissions officials would quickly review applicants
and flag applications that demonstrate a unique experience or
quality of value; a more meaningful individual review is
granted to those who make the "first cut."190 This two tiered
process is the next best, and less expensive alternative for pro-
viding meaningful review of candidates because it would re-
quire less admissions manpower than a full review of every
application submitted to a particular school.
While the Gratz court found the process of flagging files
problematic, it did not reject the practice outright. 191 LSA "cre-
ated the possibility of an applicant's file being flagged," after
admissions counselors automatically assigned a point value to
the applicant's file. 192 Indeed, reviewing all applications to a
school and flagging those of interest, might meet the guarantees
of individual review and serve as a practical means of making a
first cut for schools with a substantial number of applications.
Such a process, however, seems neither logical nor practical. At
the outset, it too remains enormously expensive since, at mini-
mum additional admissions officials would have to be available
to provide a first read-through of upwards of 20,000 applica-
tions. Moreover, initially flagging an application is likely to only
minimally decrease the number of qualified applications since
190. This is the policy that Pace Law School uses. See supra text accompany-
ing note 183.
191. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74. The Gratz Court was more concerned with
LSA's timing of flagging applications than the idea of flagging applications for re-
view purposes. Id. at 274.
Counselors may, in their discretion, flag an application for the ARC to re-
view after determining that the applicant (1) is academically prepared to
succeed at the University, (2) has achieved a minimum selection index score,
and (3) possesses a quality or characteristic important to the University's
composition of its freshman class, such as high class rank, unique life exper-
iences, challenges, circumstances, interests or talents, socioeconomic disad-
vantage, and underrepresented race, ethnicity, or geography. After
reviewing "flagged" applications, the ARC determines whether to admit, de-
fer, or deny each applicant.
Id. at 256-57.
192. Id. at 273. Moreover, flagging was "the exception and not the rule" under
LSA's policy. Id. at 274.
[Vol. 27:15
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss1/2
THE COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS
most individuals applying to a school demonstrate some type of
unique quality that might be of value to the school.
Ultimately, the court's strict scrutiny test mandates indi-
vidual review of the broadest number of applicants. Most insti-
tutes of higher education must craft new policies, and staff
them in a way that facilitates timely and full review of an in-
creasingly large number of applicants. Meeting the Court's new
mandate therefore comes at an expense to the institution and to
those it seeks to admit.
IV. Conclusion
Given the stringent requirements of the Grutter and Gratz
decisions, meeting the demands of a constitutionally permissi-
ble program seems quite demanding.' 93 Schools across the na-
tion will be forced to increase their admissions resources or
potentially forgo the ability to admit a diverse class. In the
short run, it seems likely that schools will meet the challenge,
but it will come at a great expense to those that affirmative ac-
tion seeks to benefit.
Not only is the reality of the law problematic to the longev-
ity of affirmative action admission policies, the frailty of the ma-
jority opinion in Grutter coupled with the continued national
movement against affirmative action194 pose a threat to even
those affirmative action policies that are identical to the Law
School model. 195 A further shift to the right in the Court's ideo-
logical make-up could potentially end the ability of schools to
adopt race-preference admissions policies. Only five of the nine
Justices fully agreed with the majority that the Law School's
policy in Grutter was constitutional 196 and an overwhelming
193. See supra text accompanying note 183.
194. See Mary Wiltenberg, Affirmative Action Battle Brews Anew in Michi-
gan, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 20, 2004, at 18, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/2004/0120/p18s01-legn.html.
195. See Senator Dianne Feinstein, Address Before the Los Angeles County
Bar Association and Public Counsel (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://www.sen-
ate.gov/-feinstein/05speeches/s-supreme-ct.htm (last visited September 25, 2006).
For example, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) as opposed to Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), or Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) as op-
posed to Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 274 (1955).
196. This included Justices O'Connor, Ginsberg, Breyer, Stevens and Souter.
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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majority of the Court struck down LSA's program in Gratz.197
Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court and President
Bush's nomination of conservative John Roberts is also prob-
lematic to its proponents. 19 Finally, recent anti-affirmative ac-
tion proposals such as Proposition 54 in California199 (which
would have barred bar state agencies from classifying people by
race or ethnicity) or 1-200 in Washington State200 (which pre-
cludes schools from granting preferential admissions considera-
tions based on race 201 ) further illustrate the growing trend
against pro-affirmative action policies.
The Grutter and Gratz decisions provide a bittersweet vic-
tory for those who favor affirmative action admission policies.
At best, the decision will cause an undue financial burden on
applicants and the institutions that seek to admit them. At
worst, it will provide an unworkable situation, thereby silencing
important voices and viewpoints in many of our nation's elite
educational institutions.
197. This included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor,
Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia. See generally Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
198. See generally Bush Nominates Roberts to Supreme Court, CNN.coM, July
20, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/07/19/scotus.main/.
199. See generally Richa Amar, Unequal Protection and the Racial Privacy In-
itiative, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1279-87 (2005) (discussing California's Proposition
54).
200. See generally Tom Brune, Locke Keeps Diversity as Goal, SEAITLE TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1998, at B1.
201. For a discussion in support of Proposition 54, see Lynn Vincent, Cruz
Missile: CALIFORNIA: Recall politics may thwart an initiative that would end
state classifications of citizens by race, WORLD MAGAZINE, Sept. 27, 2003, available
at http://www.worldmag.com/articles/8071.
The 'Racial Privacy Initiative' (RPI), would bar Golden State agencies from
classifying people by race or ethnicity. Its chief architect, University of Cali-
fornia regent and anti-affirmative action activist Ward Connerly, crafted
the measure to end government's preferential treatment based on race:
RPI's passage will signal America's first step towards a color-blind society.
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Robert Siegel, California Recall Hearing
(Nat'l Pub. Radio: All Things Considered, Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1439119 (reporting that California gu-
bernatorial candidate Cruz Bustamante could not spend controversially raised
campaign contributions to fight Proposition 54).
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